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Abstract
We analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets when in-
surers have better information on their customers’ risk profiles than the sponsor of health
insurance. In the optimal scheme, the sponsor uses reinsurance to screen insurers with bad
and good risks, in order to lower premiums for enrollees with high expected healthcare
costs. We then explore the effects of adding a community-rating requirement to com-
plement this risk-adjustment scheme. With community rating, insurers have incentives
to distort contract generosities to cherry-pick low-cost consumers. However, the reduced
generosity for low-cost types makes screening through reinsurance easier, allowing the
sponsor to redistribute more. When costs for reinsurance are low, or the sponsor’s bias
towards high-cost consumers is high, community rating dominates risk rating.
Keywords: health insurance, cherry-picking, risk adjustment, mechanism design
JEL classification: I13, D02, D47
∗We thank the editor, Johannes Spinnewijn, and two anonymous referees. Also, thanks to Martin Gaynor
and Ellen Meara, and seminar audiences in Rotterdam, Groningen, the CLEEN meeting in Bergen, EEA-ESEM
2014 in Toulouse and the EHEW in Hamburg 2016. Jan Boone gratefully acknowledges financial support from
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through a Vici grant.
†Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB, PO Box 80510, 2508 GM The Hague, The Nether-
lands, e-mail: m.j.bijlsma@cpb.nl
‡CentER, TILEC, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CPB and CEPR. Email: j.boone@uvt.nl.
§University of Groningen, EEF and SOM, e-mail: g.t.j.zwart@rug.nl.
1
1. Introduction
We study a competitive health-insurance market, in which a regulator (‘the sponsor’ ) inter-
venes, with the dual aims to reduce distortions due to adverse selection and to achieve re-
distribution from healthier, low-cost consumers, to poor-health, high-cost ones. Two standard
policies to achieve these goals are risk adjustment – where the sponsor taxes insurers of low-cost
types and subsidizes those of higher-cost types – and a community-rating requirement, which
obliges insurers to set premiums for a given contract independent of observable characteristics
of the consumer buying that contract. We explore the interaction between those two policies
in a setting with asymmetric information between insurers and sponsor: insurers have better
information on their consumers’ health status than the sponsor, and insurers can offer policies
with qualities or generosities that cannot be fully contracted on by the sponsor.
Many countries use risk-adjustment schemes to reduce adverse selection and achieve redis-
tributional goals. Ex-ante risk adjustment taxes or subsidizes an insurer based on observable
characteristics of its insured that provide a signal of expected health costs. By equalizing
expected healthcare costs, the sponsor reduces selection incentives for insurers and brings in-
surance premiums for consumers of different health characteristics closer together, in that way
achieving the desired redistribution. Such ex-ante risk adjustment requires verifiable data that
is relatively easy to obtain for the sponsor of health insurance.
In practice, however, the insurer usually has more information on its insured than the
sponsor, and insurers can use that information to their advantage. For instance, Brown et al.
(2014) show that in Medicare Advantage, insurers succeed in enrolling customers that are
relatively less costly compared to the risk adjustment payments received for them, and Geruso
and Layton (2015) demonstrate how in Medicare Advantage, insurers use upcoding to increase
risk-adjustment payments.1 When the insurer is better informed on its consumers’ types, the
sponsor has to elicit truthful information from the insurers on their enrollees’ health costs. To
do so, the sponsor can use ex-post risk adjustment: it compensates insurers for consumers that
turn out to be costly ex post by repaying part of the realized costs. This is a form of risk sharing
or reinsurance, with the risk adjuster playing the role of the reinsurer (see e.g. Swartz, 2003;
Dow, Fulton and Baicker, 2010). As this reduces the underlying cost differences, the insurance
1Also, the sponsor may not want to use some variables correlated with expected healthcare costs for ethical
reasons, think of ethnicity or religion, or because including them would decrease insurers’ incentives to reduce
costs, see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and Van de Ven and Schut (2011, pp. 384) for a discussion.
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contracts vary less with risk type.
Ex-post risk adjustment leaves no scope for insurers to game the system, because realized
costs are observable to the sponsor. Instead, the downside of ex-post risk adjustment is that
insurers’ incentives for cost containment are muted when the sponsor acts as a reinsurer (Dow,
Fulton and Baicker, 2010).2 In practice, risk-adjustment systems often include ex-post compo-
nents (see for instance Van de Ven et al., 2003, who describe how risk sharing is combined with
ex-ante payments in various European countries). In the US, the Health Insurance Exchanges
established under the Affordable Care Act combine a transitory reinsurance program, and a
risk-adjustment scheme that will take current period’s diagnoses as inputs (HHS, 2012). Also
the Dutch risk-adjustment system contains elements of ex-post reinsurance, alongside ex-ante
risk adjustment for observed characteristics, though the explicit ex-post component is currently
being gradually phased out to stimulate insurers to contain healthcare costs.3
Since reinsurance is socially costly, in the presence of information asymmetry between insur-
ers and sponsor, optimal risk adjustment will be incomplete and leave room for selection and
premium differences between consumer types. To complement an imperfect risk-adjustment
system, sponsors can impose premium restrictions on contracts that insurers may offer. In
practice, one important restriction is a community-rating requirement, see Gale (2007) for an
overview. Community rating (CR) means that insurers have to accept any customer and charge
the same price to each customer for a given contract.4 Policy makers’ motivation for CR is to
enforce solidarity among high-risk and low-risk consumers on the health-insurance market. In
the absence of CR, and assuming insurers and consumers have symmetric information on their
types, insurers can engage in third-degree price discrimination, also known as risk rating (RR),
and charge high (low) prices to high (low) risk consumers.
While CR may increase redistribution, a drawback is that it increases selection incentives for
insurers. If contract quality is not fully contractible to the sponsor, this may lead to distortions
in contracts offered in the market, reducing efficiency and potentially undoing the intended
redistribution. In practice, insurers have a lot of scope to distort contract generosity in ways
that are hard to regulate by the sponsor. Shepard (2016) demonstrates how the insurer’s
2Note that providing such incentives is often the reason for having private, competitive health insurance in
the first place.
3As Geruso and McGuire (2016) argue, many ex-ante risk-adjustments have some ex-post characteristics, to
the extent that they include past treatment choices. Choosing for treatment today will then influence ex-ante
risk payments next year, which influences the insurer’s incentives if consumer switching rates are low.
4This is also referred to as ‘pure community rating’. Less restrictive forms might allow for some rate
differentiation according to, for instance, age.
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provider network affects selection of enrollees. Decarolis and Guglielmo (forthcoming) analyze
changes in contract generosity including soft measures such as customer service, or healthcare
quality, in response to changing selection incentives. Carey (2017) documents how insurers
use drug benefit design to select more profitable enrollees.5 As these dimensions are not easily
contractible for the sponsor, the insurer has an advantage which can be used to game the
system. In particular, the insurer tries to cherry-pick insured whose expected costs are low
within their risk-adjustment class.
In this paper, we explore optimal risk adjustment when insurers have private information on
consumers’ cost types, and can use distortions in contract generosities to screen consumers. We
then ask how optimal risk adjustment interacts with a premium restriction: in a second-best
world, can a CR requirement be an efficient complement to a risk-adjustment scheme? To do so,
we take a mechanism design approach: how can the sponsor optimally elicit the insurers’ private
information on their consumers’ expected costs? We consider a two-tiered contracting model
with perfectly competitive insurers who offer a menu of contracts to consumers in Rothschild-
Stiglitz fashion. The insurers’ incentives for attracting high- or low-cost consumers are in turn
determined by the sponsor’s risk-adjustment mechanism. We show that the sponsor can use
ex-post risk adjustment to screen insurers on the privately observable part of expected costs.
We find that optimal risk adjustment offers the insurer a choice whether or not to buy
some reinsurance for their customers. The scheme therefore involves subjective risk adjusting
as in Sappington and Lewis (1999). Paying a tax in exchange for high ex-post reinsurance
is attractive for an insurer who knows his customers have high expected healthcare costs.
Conversely, for an insurer who faces customers with low expected healthcare costs, the costs
of reinsurance are higher than the benefits. This insurer in fact prefers to contribute to the
risk-adjustment fund instead, subsidizing the high types. In this way, optimal risk adjustment
targets the information advantage of the insurers vis-a-vis the sponsor, and allows the sponsor
to tax low-risk types to subsidize the high-risk types.6
When insurers are allowed to vary premiums for a given contract according to a consumer’s
5See also Geruso, Layton and Prinz (2016) and Lavetti and Simon (2016).
6Van de Ven and van Vliet also suggested a risk-adjustment scheme involving subjective risk adjustment:
“Let an insurer himself decide –within certain boundaries– for which patients, or for which types of care, or
to what extent he wants to share the risk with the Central Fund. (. . . ) An important advantage of such a
flexible form of risk sharing would be that the additional information the insurer might have about the residual
predictable risk that is not accounted for in the capitation payment, will not be employed for cream skimming,
but will be reflected in the preferred form of risk sharing.” (Van de Ven and van Vliet, 1992, italics are in the
original text).
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observable type – a risk-rating regime, or RR – contract prices will reflect those cost differences,
and insurers have the incentive to provide efficient contract generosities. By equalizing costs,
risk adjustment then serves the goal of bringing prices for different consumers closer together,
and in this way promotes redistribution.
The interaction of risk adjustment with CR is subtler. With a CR requirement, insurers
can no longer engage in direct price discrimination. Instead, insurers have the incentive to
introduce distortions in contract generosities to screen consumers: with mandatory insurance,
the market will feature lower-generosity insurance plans that are cheap and attractive to low-
cost consumers, as well as more generous but expensive plans that attract high-cost consumers.
In this environment, risk adjustment serves two purposes: not only does it bring prices closer
together, but it also reduces distortions in insurance generosities.
Conversely, CR also affects the effectiveness of risk adjustment. With CR, the reduced
generosity for insurance contracts aimed at low-cost consumers decreases costs for insurers to
cover this type of enrollees. In turn, this cost reduction for low-type insurance decreases the
benefits of reinsurance for such insurers, allowing the sponsor to screen those insurers more
easily and, through larger transfers, redistribute more towards the high types.
The sponsor now faces a trade-off in deciding whether to impose a CR requirement. On
the one hand, imposing CR drives insurers to distort non-contractible generosities, in an effort
to screen consumers. These distortions result in a loss of welfare. On the other hand, these
distortions make risk adjustment more effective, enabling the sponsor to redistribute more from
low-cost to high-cost consumers. With optimal risk adjustment, whether CR dominates RR is
then determined by the moral-hazard costs of reinsurance, and the degree of bias the sponsor
has towards high-cost consumers. Imposing CR is more likely to be optimal when moral hazard
for insurers is limited, or when the sponsor has a large bias towards high-cost consumers.
We analyze the trade-offs of CR in a setting with optimal risk adjustment, where reinsurance
is optional, and only chosen by high-cost insurers. In practice, risk-adjustment policies are
usually the same for all types, but similar trade-offs arise. With constant reinsurance across
insurer plans, reinsurance is more valuable to insurers with high-cost enrollees than to those
with low costs. When all insurers are reinsured and pay the same transfer to the sponsor, lower-
cost insurers pay more than their actuarially fair share, and in this way cross-subsidize the high
types. Since CR amplifies the cost differences between the types (as low-cost consumers get
suboptimal insurance), redistribution is more effective with CR also when risk adjustment is
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the same for both types.7
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, our model builds on the adverse
selection framework of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). On top of this asymmetric information
problem between insurers and insured, we add a second layer of asymmetric information: be-
tween insurers and the health-insurance sponsor. In Rothschild-Stiglitz, CR induces inefficient
under-insurance of low-risk types. Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) observe this theoretical
prediction in the real world. They document a decrease in coverage for the (healthier) young
when the state of New York imposed a CR mandate. Moreover, if insurers cannot reduce
coverage, or other dimensions of generosity, sufficiently to separate high from low-cost types,
the insurance market may enter a death spiral, where lower-cost types drop out of the market
entirely, see Cutler and Reber (1998). Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) provide a recent overview
of selection effects in insurance markets.
Second, our paper connects to the risk-adjustment literature; see Van de Ven and Ellis
(2000) and Ellis (2008) for overviews of this literature. Our paper uses a mechanism-design
approach in which ex-post risk adjustment is used to elicit the insurer’s private information
about customer types, as in Sappington and Lewis (1999). Whereas they focus on providers
who can engage in high-risk patient dumping, our model focuses on insurers who compete and
offer insurance to all consumers. Selection here takes the form of reduced generosity for low-
cost types. In contrast to Sappington and Lewis (1999), in our work the contract distortion is
endogenous, and takes place on the second tier in a hierarchical contracting model.
Also in this strand of the literature is Glazer and McGuire (2000), who explore a model where
both the sponsor and the insurers have an imperfect signal about a customer’s type. Glazer and
McGuire show how this imperfect signal should be incorporated in the risk-adjustment system
to get an efficient outcome. In our model, the sponsor has no signal about the types: to the
sponsor these types are observationally equivalent. But the insurer does have more information,
and this allows it to game the system. We show how the sponsor can address this problem by
offering ex-post risk adjustment.
Finally, our model connects to the literature on contracting hierarchies. We consider a
two-tiered model of insurers designing contracts for consumers, which in turn depend on risk-
adjustment contracts designed by the sponsor for the insurers. Related models are those of
DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (2005) and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (1999),
7In this case, however, the magnitude of moral-hazard costs is more important, as under this non-optimal
risk adjustment, also low-types are reinsured and moral-hazard costs are incurred for them.
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who look at an intermediary supervising an agent, and ask how the principal’s arrangements
with the intermediary affect those downstream contracts.
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the two-tier model of perfectly com-
petitive insurers offering incentive-compatible contracts to consumers and the sponsor offering
incentive-compatible risk-adjustment contracts to insurers. We then analyze optimal risk ad-
justment under both RR and CR requirements. We derive when and why CR outperforms
RR. We finally discuss robustness of our results to alternative modelling assumptions, and in
particular verify that similar results hold in a model with imperfect competition. Proofs can
be found in the appendix.
2. The model
We consider a model of a competitive health-insurance market, regulated by a sponsor who
designs a risk-adjustment scheme in order to redistribute towards high-cost consumers. The
model consists of two layers. The lower level is a standard Rothschild-Stiglitz market in which
competitive insurers offer insurance contracts to consumers. Insurance contracts consist of a
price p, and a generosity g; the high-cost consumers’ higher willingness to pay for generosity
enables insurers to screen different types. The upper level of the model consists of the sponsor,
who regulates this market by stipulating whether insurers are allowed to condition prices on
observed consumer types, and by implementing a risk-adjustment scheme.
2.1. Consumers, insurers, and the sponsor
We use a Rothschild-Stiglitz model for the interactions between consumers and insurers. Con-
sumers are of two possible types. A fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers has low expected healthcare
costs, while the remaining 1 − φ consumers have high expected costs. High-cost and low-cost
consumers need treatment with probabilities θh and θl resp., with θh > θl.
Competitive insurers offer insurance contracts (p, g), where p is the premium and g ≥ 0
is an inverse measure of generosity, or a decrease in quality. Full insurance corresponds with
g = 0,8 while offering insurance with g > 0 reduces costs to the insurer, but causes a larger
disutility to the consumer. We think of g > 0 as customers being forced to wait too long for
insurer response to queries, experiencing long waiting times before treatment, or being faced
8For ease of exposition, we do not consider g < 0.
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with provider networks that are overly narrow, while we define g = 0 to be first-best generosity.
Insuring a type-θ consumer with a contract of quality g costs θ(y − g). Here y are expected
healthcare costs conditional on illness. y is equal for high-cost and low-cost consumers.
A θ-type consumer who accepts a contract (p, g) has utility u(p, g|θ) with the following
standard and intuitive properties. First, if insurance is fairly priced, that is p = θ(y − g), then
consumer surplus is maximized at efficient generosity, g = 0: at g = 0, utility falls with a
marginal increase in g at the rate θ. Intuitively, for generosity close to 0, inefficient g is only a
second-order effect, and the increase in g reduces utility with the probability θ that the lack of
optimality is experienced. For g > 0, a further increase in g has a first-order effect on utility.
Secondly, at efficient generosity the types do not differ in their marginal utility of consumption
at a given price p. Finally, the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing.9 Formally, these
properties can be stated as
−up(p, 0|θ)θ + ug(p, 0|θ) = 0
−up(p, g|θ)θ + ug(p, g|θ) < 0 for g > 0.
(2)
up(p, 0|θh) = up(p, 0|θl). (3)
upp(p, g|θ) ≤ 0. (4)
We assume that all consumers participate in the insurance market; either because health
insurance is mandatory or because a sponsor is willing to subsidize health insurance such that
everyone prefers buying insurance.
Finally, we assume that high-cost consumers have a higher willingness to pay for increased
generosity (lower g) than low-cost ones, captured in the following single-crossing condition,10
Assumption 1. Consider two insurance contracts (p1, g1), (p2, g2). Then g1 < g2 if and only if
u(p1, g1|θh)− u(p2, g2|θh) > u(p1, g1|θl)− u(p2, g2|θl). (5)
9A simple example where all these conditions hold is the case where g measures any residual disutility to
the consumer after falling ill, and consumer risk aversion is modelled with mean-variance utility:
u = w − p− θg − 12rθ(1− θ)g2, (1)
where w denotes the agent’s wealth and r > 0 is a measure of risk aversion.
10See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 7) for a discussion of the single-crossing condition.
8
More generosity (lower g) is preferred by both types, but more so by the high-cost consumer.
This will allow insurers to separate high-cost consumers from low-cost consumers in situations
in which direct price discrimination is banned, as we will discuss shortly.
Insurers observe the consumers’ types, and in the absence of intervention by the sponsor,
they can offer contracts with a price that reflects a type’s costs. We will refer to this as a risk-
rating, or RR regime: insurers condition contracts – in particular, the price – on this observable
consumer type. In the competitive equilibrium, insurers offer contracts (pl = θly, gl = 0) to low-
cost consumers, and (ph = θhy, gh = 0) to high-cost consumers. In this RR regime, consumers
get first-best insurance, but high-cost consumers pay the higher price that reflects their higher
expected costs.
A sponsor may wish to contract with insurers in order to redistribute from low-cost con-
sumers to high-cost consumers. To model this preference for redistribution, we assume that the
sponsor maximizes weighted welfare and attaches weight 1− ω to high-cost consumers’ utility
and ω ∈ [0, φ] to low-cost consumers’ utility. If ω = φ then the sponsor maximizes total welfare.
Since we assume perfect competition in the insurer market, insurer profits will be zero and the
sponsor maximizes an objective
W = ωu(pl, gl|θl) + (1− ω)u(ph, gh|θh). (6)
Solidarity is captured in two ways. First, the possibility of giving a relatively higher welfare
weight to high-cost consumers than their fraction in the population would justify (ω < φ),
expresses a solidarity or equity motive on the part of the sponsor.11 Second, because upp < 0
the planner tries to keep ph and pl close together.12
If contract generosity g is contractible for the sponsor, the sponsor may require insurers
to offer first-best generosity g = 0. In addition, the sponsor may prohibit risk rating and
instead impose community rating, CR. In a CR regime, any contract offered in the market
must be accessible to any consumer type. If the sponsor imposes CR, insurers are not allowed
to condition prices for this contract on consumers’ types, and in the competitive equilibrium
11Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011) give an overview of why the sponsor might have such equity considerations.
See Bijlsma, Boone and Zwart (2014) in which a similar modelling approach is used to capture solidarity.
12Another consideration motivating redistribution from low to high risks is reclassification risk, as emphasized
in Handel, Hendel and Whinston (2015). In our paper, we consider an essentially static market where consumers
buy insurance only once, and their health type is fixed. In a repeated game, types can be dynamic. Higher
welfare weights for the high-risk types may then be viewed as the government wishing to insure consumers
against transitioning to a high-risk type sometime in the future.
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they will offer these g = 0 contracts at population average costs, p = (φθl + (1 − φ)θh)y. In
this case, low-cost consumers cross-subsidize high-cost consumers, which is optimal from the
sponsor’s solidarity objective.
If, however, g is not contractible for the sponsor, under CR insurers have an incentive to
screen consumers using distortions in generosity g. While CR doesn’t allow insurers to charge
different prices to low-cost and high-cost consumers for the same contract, insurers can engage
in second-degree price discrimination by offering contracts of differing prices and generosities,
ph, gh and pl, gl, designed so that consumers of different types self-select into the contract aimed
at their type.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium13 under CR involves a distortion in generosity
gl offered to low types, to gRS > 0 defined by
u(ph, 0|θh) = u(pl, gRS|θh), (7)
in which ph = θhy, pl = θl(y − gRS). In this separating equilibrium, high-cost consumers are
offered a full-insurance contract but pay the full costs associated to their types, while low-
cost consumers can buy insurance at lower cost, but are not fully insured since their contract
generosity is distorted: gRS > 0. The consumer incentive compatibility condition (7) makes sure
that high-cost consumers cannot gain by buying the low-cost consumers’ lower-priced contract.
We see then, that CR succeeds in achieving redistribution towards high-cost consumers if
contract generosity g is contractible for the sponsor. Without such contractibility, however,
under CR, consumers get the same deal as under RR: they get optimal insurance but pay the
full costs. Low-cost consumers do worse under CR than under RR: while they do obtain the
lower price associated with their lower expected costs, in the separating equilibrium these low-
cost consumers obtain inefficient insurance, gRS > 0, unlike in the RR situation where g
l = 0
is at the efficient level.
However, as we argued in the introduction, the examples of g suggest that in reality gen-
erosity g may not be contractible for the sponsor. When is the insurer’s response to queries
too slow?, when is the provider network too narrow?, etc.
Without contractibility of insurance generosity, when insurers can separate consumer types
through distortions in contract generosity g, the sponsor needs an additional tool to realize its
13We assume that the separating equilibrium exist. This is the case if the fraction of low consumer types, φl,
is not too large.
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solidarity objectives: risk adjustment. We turn to such risk-adjustment schemes now.
2.2. Risk adjustment
To allow redistribution from low to high-cost consumers if contract generosity g is not con-
tractible, the sponsor implements a risk-adjustment scheme. We first argue that if consumer
types are observable for the sponsor, the sponsor can simply risk adjust using an ex-ante system
of remunerations. Then we turn to the situation of interest in which the insurers have better
information than the sponsor. In this case the sponsor has to design a scheme that elicits the
information on a consumer’s type from the insurer. The instrument used to elicit that infor-
mation is ex-post risk adjustment: the sponsor reinsures part of the ex-post realized costs. We
first consider a uniform system of ex-post risk adjustment. Then we show that the sponsor can
do even better by offering menus of ex-post risk adjustments.
If the sponsor observes the consumers’ types, first-best insurance (with g = 0) can be
achieved at equal prices to low-cost and high-cost consumers, by charging insurers payments th
and tl, for each high, respectively low-cost consumer that they insure, with
th = −φy(θh − θl), tl = (1− φ)y(θh − θl). (8)
By subsidizing insurers of high-cost consumers (negative payment th) and taxing those with
low-cost consumers (positive tl), the sponsor brings insurance prices closer together. Note that
the payments in (8) satisfy budget balance,
φth + (1− φ)tl = 0. (9)
With the system of subsidies and taxes (8) in place, competitive insurers charge prices
ph = θh(y − gh) + th, pl = θl(y − gl) + tl.
It is straightforward to see that in the competitive equilibrium, we achieve pooling, with gh =
gl = 0 and ph = pl = φyθl + (1−φ)yθh. This equilibrium is irrespective of whether the sponsor
allows RR or imposes CR: since costs have been equalized, insurers have no need to introduce
distortions into their contracts to screen different consumer types.
Whereas such full ex-ante risk adjustment, in which prices are equalized across consumers
and every type obtains optimal insurance, does not require generosity g to be contractible, it
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does rely on the observability of consumer types for the sponsor. Without symmetric infor-
mation on consumer types between insurers and sponsors, insurers have the incentive to claim
its insured are all high-cost in order to benefit from the subsidy. As asymmetric information
between sponsor and insurer is the more relevant case in practice, we now turn to this case.
Types are not observable to the sponsor, and it needs to offer incentives to insurers to reveal
their consumers’ types truthfully. We explore how the sponsor can then achieve its aims by
using ex-post risk adjustment.
2.2.1. Uniform ex-post risk adjustment
If the sponsor cannot observe consumer type, but can only contract on observed treatment costs,
it can use an ex-post risk adjustment to separate insurers of low and high-cost consumers. With
ex-post risk adjustment, the sponsor effectively reinsures part of the insurer’s costs. We focus in
this subsection on the simple case of a uniform proportional risk adjustment, characterized by
a single reinsurance rate x and a contribution t. With proportional reinsurance x, the scheme
will reimburse a fraction x of total costs to the insurer. To fund the scheme, insurers will pay a
contribution t to the scheme. The zero-profit condition on the competitive equilibrium requires
that prices are then
ph = θh(y − gh)(1− x) + t, pl = θl(y − gl)(1− x) + t. (10)
At full reinsurance x = 1, insurers are not at all exposed to their consumers’ costs, and prices
for both consumer types will therefore be equal, p = t. Maximizing consumer utility will drive
insurers to offer first-best insurance generosity, g = 0. The sponsor can therefore achieve both
full equalization of prices across consumer types, and efficient insurance.
The required uniform level of contribution t that insurers pay to the sponsor is governed by
budget balance. In a benchmark case in which reinsurance does not lead to any inefficiencies,
total expected cost to the sponsor of reinsuring is equal to the expected transfers to the insurers.
If there are no additional costs from reinsurance, budget balance then requires a contribution
from the insurers equal to
t = φxθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)xθh(y − gh)
= φθly + (1− φ)θhy,
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with x = 1 and gl = gh = 0. In this situation with frictionless reinsurance, even though the
sponsor cannot observe consumer types or contract on generosity g, ex-post risk adjustment
achieves first-best insurance and full equalization of costs, with prices equal to the population-
average costs.
In reality though, ex-post reimbursement leads to moral hazard on the insurers’ side. If the
sponsor covers part of the realized costs, the incentives for insurers to keep healthcare costs low
are reduced. Indeed, insurers face the full effort cost to keep expenditure low, but a fraction x
of the benefits of low expenditure flows to the sponsor.
In the main text,14 we will include those moral-hazard costs in a reduced form by assuming
that there is an additional mark-up on total costs, εα(x, g|θ), where ε ≥ 0 is a scalar that
we use to explore comparative statics, and α(x, g|θ) measures how moral-hazard costs vary
with reinsurance rate x and generosity g. We assume α(0, g|θ) = 0 (no costs in the absence of
reinsurance), and αx ≡ ∂α∂x > 0 captures how more generous ex-post adjustment leads to higher
overall costs. To ease the exposition, we assume that higher costs εα have no value at all for
the insured.15 We then have a budget balance condition
t = φxθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)xθh(y − gh) + φεα(x, gl|θl) + (1− φ)εα(x, gh|θh), (11)
which states that total contributions by insurers t should equal total expected costs of reinsur-
ance, including those costs arising from moral hazard.
In the presence of these moral-hazard costs, we can combine the budget balance condition
(11) with the zero-profit prices (10), to find competitive-equilibrium prices for uniform risk
adjustment, as summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. With uniform ex-post risk adjustment (t, x), if insurers make zero profits and the
sponsor’s budget constraint holds with equality, prices in competitive equilibrium with contract
generosities gh and gl are given by
ph = average cost + mark-up + φ(1− x) · wedge, (12)
pl = average cost + mark-up− (1− φ)(1− x) · wedge, (13)
14Appendix B presents a simple model where insurers invest effort to reduce healthcare costs that underlies
this reduced form version.
15More generally, εα measures the difference between costs and benefits of the additional treatments used if
insurers are less vigilant about expenditure.
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with
average cost = φθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)θh(y − gh), (14)
mark-up = φεα(x, gl|θl) + (1− φ)εα(x, gh|θh), (15)
wedge = θh(y − gh)− θl(y − gl). (16)
We see that a sponsor can bring prices for low-cost and high-cost consumers closer together
by increasing ex-post risk adjustment x. At x = 1, the wedge term –driven by expected cost
differences between types– vanishes and we again have equal prices, ph = pl. But now there is
a trade-off in the form of higher overall prices caused by moral-hazard costs α as measured by
the mark-up terms, and it may pay to reduce those prices by sacrificing some redistribution.
The sponsor, optimizing weighted welfare (6), chooses the level of ex-post risk adjustment x to
balance these two forces.
2.2.2. Optimal risk adjustment: menus of contracts
Adding reinsurance helps in bringing prices for low-cost and high-cost consumers closer together,
at a cost of introducing inefficiency through insurer moral hazard. So far, we considered a
uniform ex-post risk adjustment x at a uniform price t for either insurer type. However, as we
shall now see, the sponsor can do better by allowing for different risk-adjustment schemes for
insurers, (xl, tl) and (xh, th) respectively. This allows the sponsor to screen insurers, facilitating
redistribution from low-cost insurers to higher-cost ones, at lower moral-hazard costs.
To find the optimal scheme, we follow a contract-theory approach. Given the sponsor’s in-
ability to verify a consumer’s type, each insurer should find it in its private interest to truthfully
reveal its consumers’ types. An insurer reveals its customer by self-selecting into the intended
risk-adjustment scheme. We therefore restrict to contracts that are incentive compatible (IC).
Consider a menu of risk adjustments, (xl, tl) and (xh, th), which again satisfies a budget
balance condition
φtl+(1−φ)th = φxlθl(y−gl)+(1−φ)xhθh(y−gh)+φεα(xl, gl|θl)+(1−φ)εα(xh, gh|θh). (17)
If each insurer gets the risk-adjustment scheme corresponding to its consumer’s type, prices
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in a competitive market are given by
ph = θh(y − gh)(1− xh) + th, (18)
pl = θl(y − gl)(1− xl) + tl. (19)
This parallels the expressions with uniform ex-post risk adjustment (10). Similarly, with full in-
formation, the sponsor optimally chooses xh = 0 = xl, to avoid the inefficiencies of reinsurance,
and sets transfers tl > 0, th < 0 as in (8) such that prices are equalized.
When insurers are privately informed on their consumers’ types, insurers can lie about their
consumer’s type in order to benefit from a more generous risk adjustment. To avoid such
gaming of the system, the risk-adjustment contracts need to be incentive compatible. That is,
θh(y − gh)(1− xh) + th ≤ θh(y − gh)(1− xl) + tl, (20)
θl(y − gl)(1− xl) + tl ≤ θl(y − gl)(1− xh) + th. (21)
For an insurer, truthfully revealing its customer (left-hand side) leads to lower expected costs
than lying about its type (right-hand side). Note that in these expressions the lying insurer
does not adjust g. In the proofs (of lemma 3 and 5 resp.) we check that, indeed, when an
insurer decides to lie about the type of an customer, there is no reason to offer this customer
an insurance contract with a different g.
Rewriting the IC conditions in terms of prices, using competitiveness of the insurance mar-
ket, we obtain
IChi : p
h ≤ pl + (1− xl) [θh(y − gh)− θl(y − gl)] (22)
IC li : p
l ≤ ph − (1− xh) [θh(y − gh)− θl(y − gl)] . (23)
We see that in first-best, with xh = 0 = xl and equal prices ph = pl, it is IC li that is violated,
while IChi is slack. Since the sponsor subsidizes insurers with high-cost consumers, low-cost
insurers want to pose as high types to benefit from this cross-subsidy.
To avoid such mimicking, the sponsor can use ex-post risk adjustment x, which allows for




θl(y − gl)(1− x)] ≥ ∂
∂x
[
θh(y − gh)(1− x)] , (24)
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which holds if gl ≥ gh, i.e. equilibrium contracts to high-cost consumers are at least as generous
as those aimed at low-cost consumers. We will see that this condition is verified in our model,
both in RR equilibria (when each type gets efficient generosity g = 0), and in the CR case
(when low-cost consumers may get distorted generosity gl > 0, but high-cost consumers receive
contract offers with efficient generosity gh = 0).
This single-crossing condition for insurers is the equivalent of (5) for consumers. It implies
that insurers with high-cost consumers benefit more from ex-post risk adjustment than those
with low-cost consumers. The intuition is that reinsurance is more valuable when expected
costs are higher, as this raises expected ex-post contributions from the risk-adjustment scheme.
As a result, genuine high-cost insurers have a higher willingness to pay for reinsurance. The
sponsor can use this difference in willingness to pay to separate insurers, offering reinsurance
to high-cost insurers at a price that is attractive to high-cost insurers but not to low-cost ones.
To restore incentive compatibility, the sponsor should therefore introduce xh > 0 to make
sure IC holds for the low-cost insurers. For a general scheme satisfying binding IC li and the
budget constraint, we find the analogon of lemma 1 for prices:
Lemma 2. Consider a menu of ex-post risk-adjustment contracts (th, xh) and (tl, xl), that sat-
isfy the sponsor’s budget constraint and the low-cost insurer’s incentive compatibility condition
with equality. If insurers make zero profits, and assuming that equilibrium contracts for high-
cost consumers are at least as generous as those for low-cost consumers, gh ≤ gl, then prices
in competitive equilibrium are given by
ph = average cost + mark-up + φ(1− xh) · wedge, (25)
pl = average cost + mark-up− (1− φ)(1− xh) · wedge, (26)
with
average cost = φθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)θh(y − gh), (27)
mark-up = φεα(xl, gl|θl) + (1− φ)εα(xh, gh|θh), (28)
wedge = θh(y − gh)− θl(y − gl). (29)
We see that for achieving solidarity, it is sufficient to introduce only ex-post risk adjustment
for the contract aimed at the high-cost insurer, xh > 0. We will verify later that in the optimal
scheme, the sponsor should refrain from ex-post risk adjustment for the low-types, xl = 0:
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low-type ex-post risk adjustment only results in an increased mark-up term, reflecting the
moral-hazard costs of reinsurance for low-cost insurers. Although xl increases costs through
the mark-up term, it has no benefits in terms of separating types.
Compared to the case of uniform risk adjustment, for given redistribution xh = x, the
benefit of reducing the wedge between the two prices comes at a lower mark-up in lemma 2:
only moral-hazard costs for the high-cost insurers are incurred. As a consequence, the optimal
scheme with a risk-adjustment menu will involve higher reinsurance, xh, and hence higher
redistribution, than with uniform risk adjustment.
In the remainder of this paper we focus on the case in which the sponsor can offer a menu
of risk-adjustment schemes. In section 6 we will comment on what changes if the sponsor needs
to restrict to a uniform scheme.
2.3. Timeline
Figure 1 below summarizes the timing of the game. First, the sponsor determines the menu of
risk-adjustment contracts (ti, xi), and either allows RR, or forces insurers to use CR. Insurers
observe the risk adjustment system and on that basis set contracts (pi, gi). With RR, consumers
can only buy a contract aimed at their type. With CR, consumers can opt for any offered
contract. After consumers have selected from contract offers that they are eligible for, they pay
their chosen premiums p and insurers report their consumers’ types to the sponsor. Insurers pay
the risk adjustment transfers t consistent with their reports. Finally, consumers incur health



























In the main text, a stage in which insurers exert effort to reduce treatment costs is treated
implicitly. We model this explicitly in appendix B.
So far we have not yet determined equilibrium generosities, gh and gl, that insurers choose
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when facing a particular risk-adjustment scheme. Clearly, these generosities will depend on the
choice for either community rating, CR, or risk rating, RR. In the next sections we explore
equilibrium in either case, and characterize the optimal choice of ex-post risk adjustment xh
given the insurers’ response to the sponsor’s risk-adjustment menu. It is the interaction between
this optimal risk-adjustment scheme and the choice of introducing CR or RR that will be the
focus of our analysis.
3. Risk rating
In this section we analyze optimal contracts in the case of RR, when insurers are allowed to
explicitly price discriminate based on the consumer type θh, θl that they observe –but which
the sponsor does not observe. Section 4 analyses CR. The main result with RR is that risk
adjustment moves prices closer together and redistributes towards high-cost consumers, but
does not affect the generosity of the insurance contracts.
RR without risk adjustment yields an equilibrium with the following properties. To maxi-
mize the joint insurer and consumer surplus, insurers set the efficient generosities gh = gl = 0.
Since under RR, the insurers can separate high-cost and low-cost consumers directly, there is no
reason to distort g. Both consumer types get efficient health insurance but at different prices.
Due to perfect competition, each type pays his expected costs, which are higher for a high-cost
than for a low-cost consumer, θhy > θly.
In this equilibrium with efficient generosities, when designing the risk-adjustment scheme,
the sponsor can focus on prices. How can the risk-adjustment parameters tl, th and xl, xh be
chosen in order to increase solidarity, i.e., to lower wedge ph − pl, while retaining sufficient
incentives for insurer cost reduction? To analyse that, we first characterize the RR equilibrium
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. With RR, an insurance market equilibrium always exists and has gh = gl = 0.
Further, in the sponsor’s problem, the budget constraint (17) and the low-cost insurer incentive
compatibility constraint (23) hold with equality. In the optimal risk-adjustment scheme, there
is no reinsurance for low-cost insurers, xl = 0.
With this characterization, it follows from lemma 2 that prices are as specified in that
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lemma, with generosities gl and gh set to zero, and xl = 0,
ph = φθly + (1− φ)θhy + (1− φ)εα(xh, 0|θh) + φ(1− xh)(θhy − θly), (30)
pl = φθly + (1− φ)θhy + (1− φ)εα(xh, 0|θh)− (1− φ)(1− xh)(θhy − θly). (31)
Introducing risk adjustment does not create any reason for the insurers to distort contract
generosities g away from zero: because of consumer risk aversion, consumers value increased
generosity (reduced g) more than it costs insurers to provide it. Secondly, a sponsor that values
solidarity wants to reduce the wedge between high and low prices. Because getting part of their
costs reimbursed ex post is more profitable for high-cost insurers, who face higher expected costs
than low-cost insurers, θhy > θly, separation can be achieved by raising xh, that is, increasing
ex-post risk adjustment. Of course, the disadvantage of raising xh is the inefficiency εα(xh) it
induces. This will increase costs, and hence average prices, which reduces consumer utility.
Whereas xh can reduce ph, it is clear from equations (25), (26) together with (28) that xl
can only raise prices ph, pl, while it has no effect on the redistribution term. Hence, it is no
surprise to find that in the optimal menu, the sponsor sets ex-post risk adjustment for low-cost
insurers to zero, xl = 0.16
With xh = 1, the wedge term disappears, and both types are charged the same price:
ph = pl. We assume that the sponsor does not want to redistribute more than ph = pl and
hence chooses the optimal xh ∈ [0, 1].17
It is clear that in the absence of costs to ex-post risk adjustment, when ε = 0 and moral
hazard is absent, the sponsor will choose to fully redistribute, xh = 1, so that prices for both
types are equal. Conversely, if ex-post risk adjustment is very costly, that is for ε high, the
benefits of redistribution will never outweigh the costs of doing so, and we expect that the
sponsor chooses xh = 0. The following proposition summarizes how the optimal xh (with RR)
changes as we vary the intensity ε of moral-hazard costs.
Proposition 1. With RR both consumer types get efficient health insurance gh = gl = 0, the
planner sets th ≥ tl ≥ 0. Furthermore,
• if ε = 0, there is full ex-post reinsurance, xh = 1;
• if the sponsor has a bias ω < φ, then there exists an ε¯ > 0 such that it chooses full
16This is a manifestation of the standard “no distortion at the top” result.
17The sponsor’s objective function in (6) assumes that ph ≥ pl and hence uh ≤ ul.
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reinsurance xh = 1 for all ε < ε¯;
• if ω = φ and reinsurance is costly, ε > 0, partial reinsurance obtains, xh < 1;
• for ε > 0 sufficiently large, there is no risk adjustment, th = tl = xh = xl = 0. Each
consumer type pays a premium equal to expected cost ph = θhy, pl = θly.
The proposition makes two main points. First, the analysis of changes in moral-hazard costs
ε shows when the sponsor sets full ex-post reinsurance: with ε = 0, full insurance xh = 1 is
optimal. If the sponsor’s objective function is biased towards the high-cost consumer (ω < φ),
it remains optimal for the sponsor to implement ph = pl, as long as reinsurance is not too costly
(ε < ε¯). Thus, in that case the sponsor optimally sets xh = 1 for small moral hazard ε > 0.
For higher ε > 0, we get partial reinsurance xh < 1. If insurance moral hazard is strong, the
sponsor cannot use reinsurance at all, xh = 0.
Second, the proposition makes clear how the risk-adjustment mechanism succeeds in sep-
arating insurer types and hence redistributing from low- to high-cost insurers. The sponsor
effectively offers insurers the choice of either buying reinsurance xh > 0 at a price th, or paying
(a tax) tl < th without reinsurance (xl = 0). For high-cost insurers, reinsurance is attractive.
They receive ex-post risk adjustment with a probability θh > θl and their total compensation
from reinsurance is positive. For low-cost insurers, however, the cost of reinsurance exceeds the
benefit. They prefer paying a tax tl < th instead. This tax allows the sponsor to cross-subsidize
the high types. As a result, risk adjustment moves prices closer together and redistributes
towards high-cost consumers.
4. Community Rating
Under CR, insurers cannot discriminate based on consumers’ observable characteristics. This
can arise because the sponsor does not allow insurers to use their information on relevant
characteristics when selling insurance, or because insurers do not observe such characteristics
when selling the contract.
As discussed, without risk adjustment, under CR the insurers separate consumers by offer-
ing contracts that induce consumers to self-select, based on their types: equilibrium contracts
(pl, gl), (ph, gh) have to satisfy consumer incentive compatibility (ICh,lc ) to get truthful revela-
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tion by the insured consumers:
u(ph, gh|θh) ≥ u(pl, gl|θh), (IChc )
u(pl, gl|θl) ≥ u(ph, gh|θl). (IC lc)
In words, the high-cost consumer is (weakly) better off buying the h-contract than with
the l-contract. Similarly, for the low-cost consumer and l-contract. Note that these IC con-
straints do not assume that two different contracts are offered (although this will be the case
in equilibrium). The inequalities are satisfied if ph = pl and gh = gl.
We now analyze how the equilibrium contracts that insurers offer to consumers change,
when the sponsor offers a risk-adjustment scheme to the insurers. Also with risk adjustment,
a separating equilibrium should involve contracts satisfying consumer incentive compatibility.
These constraints introduce distortions in generosity g that we have to take into account.
Taking the risk-adjustment scheme as given, we define the CR competitive market equilib-
rium as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976):
Definition 1. Vector (pl, gl, ph, gh) forms a CR equilibrium, given the risk-adjustment scheme
(tl, xl, th, xh), if
• contracts (pl, gl), (ph, gh) satisfy consumer incentive compatibility conditions (IChc ) and
(IC lc),
• each contract that is offered earns a non-negative profit and
• it is not possible to introduce a (new) contract which makes strictly positive profits.
From the definition, we can make a number of observations on the equilibrium.
Lemma 4. If a CR equilibrium exists, it satisfies the following conditions
1. high types get efficient generosity, gh = 0,
2. (IChc ) holds with equality and
3. insurers make zero profits.
These properties of the equilibrium, familiar from the Rothschild-Stiglitz context, carry over
for any risk-adjustment scheme. The intuition is that, because generosity g = 0 is optimal, see
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equation (2), the cost saving of a marginal reduction in g > 0 is always less than the value
the consumer attaches to such a decrease in generosity. The only reason for not setting g to
0 is that a constraint is hit. While the IChc constraint bars g
l from being equal to 0, nothing
stops gh from being set efficiently, because the low-cost consumer does not want to mimic the
high-cost consumer: we find gh = 0.
With RR, lemma 3 guarantees existence of an equilibrium. It is well known that existence
of a separating Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is not guaranteed, as there may be a profitable
deviation to a pooling contract if the proportion of low-cost consumers φ is sufficiently high.
For the remainder of this analysis we ignore this issue. We note that the sponsor can always
design a risk-adjustment scheme (tl, xl), (th, xh), such that an equilibrium exists. In particular,
a (pooling) equilibrium exists by setting xh = 1, xl = 0. Then it is the case that ph = pl and
gh = gl = 0.
We now turn to explore the sponsor’s optimization problem, (6), using the constraints
that are summarized in lemma 4. The sponsor chooses a set of risk-adjustment contracts,
(tl, xl), (th, xh), such that the resulting equilibrium in the health-insurance market (pl, gl), (ph, gh)
maximizes weighted consumer surplus. With RR we have xl = 0 (see lemma 3) because xl raises
prices ph, pl, while it does not affect redistribution. A similar reasoning leads to xl = 0 with
CR as well. Also, as in the RR case, the low-cost insurer’s incentive compatibility constraint
and the budget constraint hold with equality:
Lemma 5. Assume that a CR equilibrium exists. In the optimum, insurer incentive compatibil-
ity IC li and the budget constraint BC hold with equality, and there is no ex-post risk adjustment
for low-cost insurers, xl = 0.
From this lemma, we can again conclude that prices are given by lemma 2. In addition, we
know from lemma 4 that high-cost generosity is efficient, gh = 0, so that
ph = φθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)θhy + (1− φ)εα(xh, 0|θh) + φ(1− xh)(θhy − θl(y − gl)), (32)
pl = φθl(y − gl) + (1− φ)θhy + (1− φ)εα(xh, 0|θh)− (1− φ)(1− xh)(θhy − θl(y − gl)). (33)
We are now ready to analyze the sponsor’s optimization problem: substituting the results
from lemmas 4 and 5 in the binding constraints, we study the optimal choice of ex-post risk
adjustment xh for high-cost insurers. Compared to the analysis under RR, we now also have
to take into account that, in the CR market equilibrium, generosity gl may be positive. As
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in the case of RR, we again characterize optimal xh as a function of the cost of reinsurance,
parametrized by ε. In particular, we are interested in how optimal risk adjustment changes in
the neighborhood of the full-reinsurance point, xh = 1, as we increase reinsurance costs ε > 0.
We have the following result.
Proposition 2. With CR, the planner sets th ≥ tl ≥ 0, gh = 0. gl ≥ 0 such that consumer
incentive compatibility IChc binds. Furthermore,
• if ε = 0, there is full ex-post reinsurance, xh = 1 and low-type generosity is undistorted,
gl = 0;
• if the sponsor has a bias ω < φ, then there exists an ε¯ > 0 such that it chooses full
reinsurance xh = 1 and generosities are undistorted, gl = 0 for each ε < ε¯;
• if ω = φ and reinsurance is costly, ε > 0, partial reinsurance obtains, xh < 1, and the low
types’ generosity, gl, is distorted, glRS ≥ gl > 0;
• for ε > 0 sufficiently large, there is no risk adjustment, th = tl = xh = xl = 0. Low-type
generosity distortion is at the Rothschild-Stiglitz level, gl = glRS > 0.
As in the RR case, high-cost insurers opt for reinsurance and pay less than the actuarial cost
of such reinsurance through the ex-ante payment th. For low-cost insurers, ex-post insurance
is less valuable since their expected costs are lower, with the consequence that they prefer
paying a tax tl. This again forces prices closer together than would be the case without risk
adjustment, and helps achieving redistribution.
With CR, as opposed to RR, there is another benefit of risk adjustment, apart from re-
distribution. In the absence of risk adjustment, insurers use distortions of contract generosity
to separate high-cost consumers from low-cost ones. Setting low-type contract generosity to
gl = gRS > 0 makes sure that high-cost consumers do not pose as low-cost ones, and instead
self-select in the more expensive high-cost contract. Ex-post risk adjustment reduces the cost
difference between types, which translates into a smaller price difference. This smaller price
difference relaxes consumer incentive compatibility, allowing insurers to reduce the distortion
gl on low-cost consumer generosity.
As in the RR case, if ex-post risk adjustment does not lead to higher costs (ε = 0), the
sponsor implements the efficient outcome with xh = 1, full reinsurance. In that case, prices
are equal for both consumer types, equations (32,33), and there is no remaining distortion in
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generosity, gl = 0. If ε > 0 and the sponsor maximizes total welfare (ω = φ), the cost of
ex-post risk adjustment implies incomplete risk adjustment, leading to some selection incentive
for insurers, who now set gl > 0. However, as in the RR case, if the sponsor puts more weight
on the h-consumers (ω < φ), a range of ε > 0 exists such that the sponsor implements xh = 1
and gl = 0. For ε > 0 close enough to 0, increasing xh reduces ph. This reduction in ph at the
expense of low-cost consumers increases welfare if ω < φ: low-cost consumers pay for the costs
of ex-post risk adjustment, and this cost has a lower weight in the sponsor’s objective function.
For high values of ε, also ph is increasing in xh to reflect increased moral-hazard costs; from
that point onward, there is incomplete reinsurance, xh < 1, and in equilibrium insurers distort
generosity gl > 0.
If the inefficiency of ex-post reinsurance is high enough, the sponsor does not use risk
adjustment at all (xh = xl = 0 and th = tl = 0 because of (17)). The standard Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium then obtains, with gl = gRS > 0. Comparing with RR, we know that in this
case without risk adjustment, welfare is higher with RR than it is with CR. Indeed, without
risk adjustment, the contracts for high-cost consumers are the same under RR and CR while
there is inefficient generosity for the low-cost consumers (gl > 0) under CR, as insurers use
generosity distortion to separate the types. In contrast, for low costs of ex-post reinsurance, in
the following section we show that CR can lead to higher welfare than RR.
5. When is CR optimal?
Without risk adjustment, CR is Pareto inferior to RR, in a setting where insurers can use
non-contractible quality to separate high-cost consumers from low-cost ones.18 The reason is
that with separating contracts, high-cost consumers are not better off in CR than in RR, while
there is an additional distortion gl > 0 that decreases welfare for low-cost consumers.
With risk adjustment, we have a similar welfare-decreasing generosity distortion on low-
cost consumers. However, the interaction between community rating and the risk-adjustment
scheme creates a compensating effect that dominates when generosity distortions are sufficiently
low, which is the case when reinsurance costs are not too high.
18As discussed in section 2, in settings in which insurers have no quality dimension to screen consumers, or in
which quality is contractible for the sponsor, community rating is preferable if the sponsor has a bias towards
high-cost consumers.
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Let WRR(ε) denote the optimal value of weighted welfare (6) in the RR case and WCR(ε)
in the CR case as a function of ε, the scale of the moral-hazard costs of reinsurance. We then
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If ω < φ and assuming that xhRR(ε) = 1 is globally optimal whenever it is
locally optimal. Then:
1. WCR(ε) = WRR(ε) for ε ≥ 0 small enough;
2. WCR(ε) > WRR(ε) for ε > 0 in a middle range;
3. WRR(ε) > WCR(ε) for ω > 0 and ε big enough.
As we make few assumptions on second derivatives, we cannot be sure that the optimal xh
is well behaved as a function of ε. For our result that CR can dominate RR, we only need that
xh under RR remains at its maximum level until that ceases to be locally optimal.
The intuition for this result is that increasing gl means reducing the cost of insuring a
low-cost consumer. There is an advantage in that reduced cost when introducing reinsurance:
the value to a low-cost insurer of mimicking a high-cost one, and buying reinsurance from the
sponsor, goes down. Hence, with gl > 0, the sponsor can, for the same amount of reinsurance
xh, levy a larger tax tl from low-cost insurers without violating their incentive compatibility
condition. In other words, higher gl relaxes (IC li) and hence allows the sponsor to reduce the
price difference between contracts for both types. In this way, the sponsor achieves higher
redistribution.
A sponsor that maximizes weighted welfare will therefore prefer to have some generosity
distortion gl for low-type consumers, balancing the improved redistribution with the costs of
inefficient insurance for low-cost consumers. While the sponsor cannot actively set gl > 0
(generosity is not contractible), it can endogenously create a generosity distortion by imposing
a community-rating requirement, causing insurers to choose positive gl in market equilibrium
for screening purposes.
For ε ≥ 0 small enough and ω < φ, we know from propositions 1 and 2 that the solutions
under RR and CR are the same: xh = 1, gl = 0 and prices are the same as well. Hence,
WCR = WRR for these values of ε, and there is no need to introduce CR. Further, if ε is big
enough that no risk adjustment is used (xh = th = tl = 0), the benefit of relaxing insurer
incentive compatibility is not operative. In this case, we only have the disadvantage of reduced
low-cost welfare, and RR dominates CR.
25
The most interesting case is in between these two extremes. The proposition shows that a
range of moral-hazard costs ε exists such that CR dominates RR in terms of weighted welfare
W . The enhanced redistribution of CR, with its distortive generosity gl > 0, here outperforms
RR which has efficient coverage for both types.
CR thus outperforms RR if the cost of reinsurance is small but not too small. In this
sense, policy makers’ preference for CR can be better founded than health economists tend to
acknowledge. A bias in favour of high-cost consumers because the sponsor values solidarity
together with risk adjustment as an instrument to screen insurers can motivate a choice for
CR.
6. Robustness
6.1. Uniform risk adjustment
Optimal risk adjustment allows the sponsor to screen insurers, by offering a choice for insurers
to buy reinsurance xh > 0 at price th, or to forgo reinsurance (xl = 0) and paying a tax tl < th.
For genuinely high-cost insurers, reinsurance is attractively priced, but low-cost insurers prefer
to pay the tax, subsidizing the high-cost market.
In practice we do not observe such risk-adjustment menus. Instead, in practice insurers are
exposed to a uniform risk adjustment schedule, xh = xl, with th = tl. As we discussed in lemma
1, also in that case prices for both types are brought closer together. The drawback of uniform
risk adjustment is the increased cost of moral hazard, as now costs εα are also incurred on the
low-type insurer. As a result, the mark-up on prices in the uniform case grows faster with x.
Since this is the only change, the qualitative results of our analysis hold true also in the case
of uniform risk adjustment.
6.2. Imperfect competition
Our paper builds on a Rothschild-Stiglitz model with perfect competition among insurers. In
practice, market power can be important in health-insurance markets, as was demonstrated for
instance in Dafny (2010). Lustig (2010) and Starc (2014) find evidence for welfare effects of
market power dominating those of selection in the Medicare + Choice and Medigap markets,
respectively. Moreover, risk-adjustment systems can interact in interesting ways with market
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power, as demonstrated for example in Mahoney and Weyl (forthcoming), who find that in
the presence of market power, risk adjustment may even decrease coverage and welfare when
insurers have no instruments to screen consumers and insurance is not mandatory.
To explore the effects of imperfect competition in our model with consumer screening
through generosity, we turn to a Hotelling duopoly model of competition in insurance con-
tracts, as in Bijlsma, Boone and Zwart (2014)19. Consider two profit-maximizing insurers lo-
cated at either end of a Hotelling line, with consumers located homogeneously along that line.
We assume that consumers’ types are independent of their location. Consumers incur travel
costs s, and choose the insurer that maximizes their utility. Each insurer i offers a menu of con-
tracts, (phi , g
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high-cost consumers, where uli and u
h
i are the utilities from accepting the low- and high-type
contracts from insurer i.
The sponsor offers a risk adjustment menu (tl, xl), (th, xh), with budget constraint and
insurer incentive compatibility conditions as before, so that we can introduce cost levels ch and
cl which satify
ch ≡ th + (1− xh)θh(y − gh) = average cost + mark-up + φ(1− xh) · wedge
cl ≡ tl + (1− xl)θl(y − gl) = average cost + mark-up− (1− φ)(1− xh) · wedge
as in lemma 2. The difference with that situation is, of course, that, with market power, prices
are not equal to costs but rather are determined by the insurers’ profit maximization.
Let us for simplicity consider the case in which utilities are linear in prices, u(p, g) =
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+ λ(pli − phi + θh(v(ghi )− v(gli)))
where λ ≥ 0 is the shadow price of the consumer incentive compatibility constraint IChc . The
19For another approach to modelling market power when insurers compete in menus of contracts, see e.g.
Lester et al. (2015).
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first order conditions for pl, ph in symmetric equilibrium can be written as
ph = ch + s− 2sλ
1− φ (34)




With risk rating IChc is not relevant and λ = 0. As under perfect competition, insurers
maximize joint surplus with consumers by offering first-best generosities, gh = 0 = gl, and
prices are similar to those under perfect competition except for the standard market-power
mark-up equal to the travel cost parameter s,
ph = ch + s
pl = cl + s.
Under a CR regime, as with perfect competition, IChc is binding (λ > 0). This leads to a
distortion in low-type generosity, gl ≥ 0. With full risk adjustment, gl and λ are zero, but as
we move away from xh = 1, both the shadow price and the distortion in low-type generosity gl
start to increase.
The sponsor’s maximization problem over weighted consumer surplus is then similar to the
problem with perfect competition: xl will be set to zero for the same reasons. In the RR regime,
the sponsor faces the same problem as before, with prices shifted by the constant market-power
mark-up s. Only for the CR regime is there a qualitative difference with the perfect-competition
benchmark: when moving away from full adjustment, xh = 1, consumer incentive compatibility
induces the firms to reduce the market-power mark-up charged to high-cost consumers, financed
by increased mark-ups on the low types, keeping the average market-power mark-up equal to
s.20
The analysis of optimal choice of risk adjustment around xh = 1 (i.e., for low values of moral
hazard parameter ε) then mirrors that for the perfect competition case, propositions 1 and 2,
with the market-power mark-up effect favouring the community-rating environment slightly
more than in the perfect-competition case. Indeed, if ω = 0, so that generosity distortions gl
20Bijlsma, Boone and Zwart (2014) exploit this effect of incentive compatibility linking mark-ups for low and
high types, to argue that when competition for low types is more vigorous, distortions in gl are more attractive
since they leverage benefits from this low type competition to the high-cost consumers. Full risk equalization,
even if costless, may then be suboptimal for a biased sponsor.
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for the low types have no impact on the sponsor’s objective, even with large moral hazard ε,
CR is the dominating regime.
The intuition for the result remains the same: distorting gl, though adversely impacting
low-type utility, also makes it easier to screen insurers, and hence to make the transfer of
surplus from low-type to high-type consumers easier. The sponsor would like to set gl > 0 to
its optimal value. Since this is not feasible, the sponsor enforces CR to make sure that insurers
endogenously introduce such a distortion.
6.3. Multi-dimensional types
The main result of section 5 is that –under an assumption on the inefficiency of reinsurance ε–
the sponsor prefers to distort the market outcome to facilitate redistribution from low-cost to
high-cost consumers. For this result we need that the type that gets distorted away from first
best, is the type that is relatively disliked by the sponsor. In our case, the low-cost type gets
distorted (gl > 0) and is relatively undervalued (ω < φ) by the sponsor. The low-cost distortion
helps the sponsor to separate low-cost and high-cost insurers and hence to redistribute from
low-cost to high-cost consumers. Although this property holds across a range of models, we
give two examples where it does not necessarily hold.
First, Bundorf, Levin and Mahoney (2012) introduce a model where consumers differ on
more than one dimension, while insurers discriminate along one dimension (expected health
costs or health risk) only. If price differences between plan options do not fully reflect the cost
differences, some customers choose the wrong plan from a social point of view. Although in
our set-up each type has its own contract, equations (34,35) also imply that ph − pl < ch − cl
in case insurers have market power (s > 0) and there is CR (λ > 0).
Assuming that the sponsor is interested in redistribution along health risk only (and not the
other dimensions), it can no longer target the high-cost type. Indeed, this type is now “mixed”
with the low-cost type in each contract. This implies that some low-cost consumers will benefit
from the redistribution and some high-cost consumers suffer from the distortion. This makes
CR less attractive for the sponsor compared to the situation where each cost type has its own
contract, but not necessarily irrelevant.
Second, extending this logic, CR is no longer optimal if all high-cost types choose the
“wrong” contract. Boone and Schottmu¨ller (2017) present a model in which this can happen.
The starting point of this paper is that agents differ in two dimensions: health risk and income.
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Further, these two dimensions are negatively correlated; to illustrate, high health risk tends to
go hand-in-hand with low income. As health is a normal good, low-income consumers can decide
to choose the cheaper distorted contract while high income consumers choose the undistorted
contract. CR in this case directly hurts the high-cost (low-income) type which is valued more
by the sponsor. In this case, CR does not help the sponsor to redistribute towards the high-cost
consumers.
7. Conclusion
We studied optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets when insurers have
better information on their customers’ risk profiles than the sponsor of the health-insurance
scheme. Such an information advantage occurs if the insurer observes more consumer charac-
teristics than a system based upon ex-ante observable characteristics of its insured can correct
for and allows insurers to game the system by cherry-picking insured whose expected costs are
low. The sponsor can try to reduce this inefficiency by inducing insurers to truthfully reveal
their private information on their customers’ health costs through ex-post risk adjustment,
which compensates insurers for consumers that turn out to be costly ex post. By offering such
reinsurance, the sponsor can screen insurers and redistribute from low to high-risk consumers.
If reinsurance does not induce costs due to moral hazard, the sponsor can achieve both first-
best insurance as well as solidarity by completely reinsuring insurers. In practice, however, such
ex-post risk adjustment is socially costly due to moral hazard and the sponsor will optimally
only offer partial reinsurance. As a result, when insurers are allowed to vary premiums for a
given contract according to a consumers observable type, that is, under RR, insurers will charge
high prices to high-cost consumers and low prices to low-cost consumers.
The sponsor can improve on this equilibrium by introducing a premium restriction in the
form of CR. On the one hand, this restriction comes at a potential cost because it increases
selection incentives for the insurers, which induces contract distortions if contract generosity is
non-contractible. In health insurance, contract generosity is typically hard to contract on for the
sponsor. Insurers will then distort contract generosity in order screen high-cost from low-cost
consumers. On the other hand, the reduced generosity makes risk-adjustment more effective
in screening insurer types: by reducing the insurers’ expected costs for low-risk consumers,
CR makes reinsurance a less attractive option for these insurers. This makes it easier for the
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sponsor to screen insurer types and hence allows more redistribution from low to high-risk
consumers, raising welfare.
Although in our setting CR is never optimal in the absence of a motivation to screen
insurers, when risk adjustment tries to elicit the insurers’ private information, CR can raise total
weighted surplus if the cost of reinsurance is low or the sponsor’s preference for redistribution
is sufficiently high. Thus, our analysis both provides a rationale behind the presence of CR
requirements seen in reality and clarifies the subtle interaction between CR and risk adjustment,
that is somewhat different from the straightforward motivation of policy-makers to enforce
solidarity among high-risk and low-risk consumers on the health-insurance market.
We focused our analysis on markets in which the sponsor has no information on consumer
types and the sponsor only uses ex-post risk adjustment. In reality, consumer risk characteristics
may be partly observable to the sponsor. The sponsor will then optimally use ex-ante risk
adjustment for these observable characteristics, adding ex-post risk adjustment to screen for
differences within a given risk class that are unobservable to the sponsor. As the extent of
asymmetric information will vary across risk classes, ideally the degree of reinsurance will also
depend on these risk classes.
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A. Proofs of results
Proof of lemma 3 The proof has the following steps. First, we argue that gl = gh = 0. Then,
we show that xl = 0 assuming that (23) and (17) are binding. Finally, we check that (22) is
satisfied as well.
Because insurers can risk-rate, insurance contracts do not have to satisfy consumer incentive
compatibility constraints (as with CR in section 4). Suppose in equilibrium one of the insurers
offers a contract with inefficient generosity, g > 0. Using prices in (18,19), we find that
du(p, g)
dg
= −upθ(1− x) + ug < 0 (36)
because of (2): consumers value increased generosity (lower g) more than it costs to provide
that generosity for any reinsurance x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the insurer can raise profits by reducing
g. Hence both h and l-consumers get offered efficient insurance contracts (g = 0). Note that
gh = gl = 0 holds irrespective of whether the insurer reports the customer’s type truthfully to
the sponsor.
Budget balance, equation (17) holds with equality. If it would be slack, it is possible to
lower th, tl keeping IC li and IC
h
i binding. This unambiguously increases the sponsor’s objective
function, as it reduces prices. Next consider the insurer IC constraints. At least one of these is
binding. Suppose not, i.e. both (22) and (23) are slack. Then we can reduce ph and increase
pl (by adjusting th,l) in a way that satisfies budget balance, (17). This increases W because
ω ≤ φ, upp ≤ 0 and (23), with gh = gl = 0, implies that ph > pl. We assume here that (23) is
binding and check afterwards that (22) is satisfied as well.
Because both low-cost insurer incentive compatibility (23) and budget balance (17) hold
with equality, we use lemma 2 for the prices ph, pl. Then the effect of xl is only to increase
prices (by the wedge term). It follows that xl = 0.
We finish this proof by checking that high-type incentive compatibility (22) is satisfied. This
follows from binding IC li and x
h ≥ 0 = xl. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1 With xl = gl = gh = 0 –from lemma 3– we have prices given by


















= (1− φ)εαx(xh, 0|θh)(ωulp + (1− ω)uhp) + (θh − θl)y(|uhp |φ(1− ω)− |ulp|ω(1− φ))
The first term, reflecting the mark-up term in the prices, leads to increases in both prices
with xh, since αx > 0. With up < 0, this reduces W . The second term is non-negative:
with ph ≥ pl, we have |uhp | ≥ |ulp|, and in addition ω ≤ φ. As one raises xh, the wedge-term
in prices causes a decrease in ph and an increase in pl, increasing solidarity and hence W .
Evidently, if ε = 0, the mark-up is zero, and the only effect of increasing xh is bringing prices
closer together, unambiguously increasing weighted welfare. Hence xh takes its maximal value
xh = 1, and prices are equalized.
For positive moral-hazard costs ε > 0, and ω = φ, then in xh = 1, where prices are equal,
the second, positive term vanishes and ∂W/∂xh|xh=1 < 0. Hence xh < 1.
If ω < φ, at xh = 1 the derivative remains positive for ε sufficiently small, so there exists
ε¯ > 0 as defined in the proposition.
Finally, equation (21) implies
th − tl = θlyxh ≥ 0 (38)
and from (17) it follows that low types are taxed to bring prices closer together,
tl = (1− φ)xh(θh − θl)y + (1− φ)εα(xh, 0|θh) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4
• Suppose to the contrary that high types receive inefficient generosity, gh > 0. Then an
insurer could offer a new, more profitable contract with slightly better generosity, as, by
inequality (2), the high type consumer’s value of such lower gh grows more strongly than
the costs to the insurer. Such a new contract will certainly continue to satisfy consumer
incentive compatibility IChc . If l-consumers decide to buy this contract as well, it becomes
more profitable as their expected costs are lower. This profitable deviation contradicts
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definition 1. Hence gh = 0.
• Suppose –by contradiction– that IChc is slack. We consider two cases:
– gl > 0: because of equation (2), a new contract with g˜l < gl and p˜l > pl + (gl− g˜l)θl
can be introduced which l-consumers prefer (but h-consumers do not; as IChc is
slack by assumption) and which leads to strictly positive profits. This contradicts
definition 1.
– gl = 0: then we have
u(ph, 0|θh) > u(pl, 0|θh)(slackness of IChc )
u(pl, 0|θl) ≥ u(ph, 0|θl)(by IC lc).
But this is impossible because up < 0.
Hence, in each case there is a violation and thus IChc cannot be slack. With (IC
h
c ) holding
with equality, assumption 5 implies that (IC lc) is satisfied as well.
• Suppose an insurer makes positive profits in equilibrium. If positive profits are from h-
consumers, an insurer can offer a new contract with slightly lower ph and make a strictly
positive profit. Even if l-consumers choose this contract as well, it is profitable (as l-
consumers have lower expected costs than h-consumers). This contradicts definition 1.
Next, consider the case where the insurers make a profit on the l-consumers. Then one
can construct a new profitable contract g˜l > gl, p˜l < pl such that IChc remains satisfied
and the new contract is more attractive to l-consumers. Again this contradicts definition
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 5
• We first show that IC li binds. Assume to the contrary that IC li is slack. First, suppose
that gl > 0. Then the sponsor can slightly increase th and decrease tl without violating
IC li (such a change cannot violate IC
h
i ). Such a transfer from l- to h-consumers is in itself
beneficial for welfare, as welfare is biased towards h-consumers. The transfer increases
pl and decrease ph, which relaxes IChc . This, in turn, allows g
l to fall in the resulting
equilibrium, and hence W is increased; a contradiction.
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If, instead, gl = 0, we are in a pooling equilibrium, with necessarily pl = ph, or
th + (1− xh)θhy = ph = pl = tl + (1− xl)θly < th + (1− xh)θly
where the inequality represents slack IC li . But this cannot hold as θ
l < θh.
• Next, we verify that if IC li holds, an insurer cannot gain either by offering low-cost
consumers a different g 6= gl and then claiming it is an h-consumer.
First, consider g > gl. The l-insurer costs become θl(y − g) < θl(y − gl). Hence, if
deviation to the high-type risk-adjustment contract (th, xh) is not profitable at gl, it is
certainly not profitable at g > gl.
Second, consider offering a contract g < gl (in case gl > 0), and lying to the sponsor. To
make this deviation contract (p, g) attractive for the l-consumer, it needs to be the case
that u(p, g|θl) ≥ u(pl, gl|θl). Then a binding (IChc ) together with assumption 5 implies
that u(p, g|θh) > u(ph, 0|θh): h-consumers value the increased generosity even more and
buy this contract as well. We find that, with risk adjustment choice (xh, th), total costs
of serving this mixture of consumers exceed total costs of serving l-consumers at gl,
th + φ(1− xh)θl(y − g) + (1− φ)(1− xh)θh(y − g) ≥ th + (1− xh)θl(y − gl). (39)
so that if truthfully revealing type dominates lying at gl (IC li holds), then it certainly
does so at g < gl.
• Next, if (17) is slack, it would be possible to lower th, tl and gl, keeping IC li and IChc
binding. This unambiguously increases the sponsor’s welfare.
• With (23) and (17) binding, lemma 2 gives us prices ph, pl.
• Next, we show that xl = 0. The effect of increasing xl from xl = 0 to a positive value
directly increases both prices since αx > 0, and as in the RR case, this harms both types’
welfare. The difference with the RR case is that now also gl changes to make sure IChc
binds with equality. We need to verify that the changes in gl do not make xl > 0 optimal.
We consider therefore any xl > 0 and the associated mark-up φεα¯l with α¯l ≡ α(xl, gl|θl) >
0 and gl(α¯l) consistent with binding IChc . We show that a shift from x
l = 0, where αl = 0
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with gl = gl(0), to positive xl where αl = α¯l > 0 with gl = gl(α¯l) always decreases both
uh and ul, so that the sponsor’s welfare decreases for any ω.
We use figure 2. The curves show indifference curves for the l and h-consumer through
the low type’s contract (pl, gl). We have that (ph, gh = 0) and (pl, gl) should always be
on the same h-consumer’s indifference curve, by binding IChc . Furthermore, prices are












= −φθl − (1− φ)(1− xh)θl
 < 0≥ −θl (43)
Consider two cases: one in which equilibrium gl(αl) decreases as αl grows, and one in
which gl increases with αl. We show that in both cases, as we increase mark-up αl, W is
decreasing. Hence, αl = 0 (which is the case when xl = 0) is optimal.















so ph increases with rising αl, and hence high types are worse off (uh decreases: indifference
curve shifts upward in figure 2). Since gl decreases by assumption, the new intersection
(pl, gl) in the figure will be in region A in the figure, and clearly ul also decreases. Hence,
in this case, the increase in αl reduces both uh and ul and thus W .


















From equation (2): dpl/dgl = −ug/up ¡ -θ. The indifference curve ul has slope less (i.e.









Figure 2: The indifference curves for h and l-consumers. Regions A and B are bordered by the
(nearest) lines.
bigger than θl. However, |∂pl/∂gl| ≤ θl by equation (43) and ul falls (indifference curve
shifts upward). As gl increases in this case, (pl, gl) is in region B and again, both uh and
ul decrease. Therefore, also in this case, W falls with αl.
Hence, as we increase the mark-up from l-insurer moral hazard, αl, from zero to any
positive value, and update gl along that path to keep IChc binding with equality, W
decreases. Hence the sponsor should set xl = 0.
• Finally, we check that (22) is satisfied. With gh = 0, binding IC li implies that (22) is
equivalent to xh ≥ xl. Since xl = 0, this holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 With CR, changing xh also implies changing gl, as both are
connected through the binding consumer incentive compatibility constraint (IChc ). To find the
















where we used shorthand
uˆh = u(pl, gl|θh), uh = u(ph, 0|θh).
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From the expressions for prices in the CR case, equations (32,33) we find
∂ph
∂xh
= (1− φ)εαhx − φ(θhy − θl(y − gl)) (46)
∂ph
∂gl
= −φθl + φ(1− xh)θl (47)
∂pl
∂xh
= (1− φ)εαhx + (1− φ)(θhy − θl(y − gl)) (48)
∂pl
∂gl
= −φθl − (1− φ)(1− xh)θl (49)
Using this and evaluating at xh = 1, gl = 0, where prices are equal, we find
∂W
∂xh
= (−up)[−(1− φ)εαhx + (φ− ω)∆θy] (50)
∂W
∂gl




















Hence, at ε = 0, xh = 1 is optimal, while with φ − ω positive, xh = 1 remains optimal for ε
small but positive. For ε big enough, (53) turns negative and xh < 1 becomes optimal.
At the opposite extreme, for ε high enough, the increase in prices through moral-hazard
costs εαhx at x
h = 0 is higher than any potential gain from changes in gl or redistribution, since
the latter contributions to welfare do not scale with ε. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 First note that ε = 0 implies WRR(0) = WCR(0) because in this
case xh = 1, pl = ph and gl = gh = 0 under both RR and CR. Further, propositions 1 and 2
imply that for ω < φ there exists ε¯ such that WRR(ε) = WCR(ε) for each ε ∈ [0, ε¯].






[−(1− φ)εαhx + (φ− ω)∆θy]
> (−up)
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Thus, there exist values of ε such that ∂WRR/∂x
h|xh=1 ≥ 0 > ∂WCR/∂xh|xh=1. For these
values of ε we have xhRR(ε) = 1 > x
h
CR(ε). With a slight abuse of notation, we write welfare as
W (ε, xh(ε)). Then we have for these values of ε that21
WCR(ε, x
h
CR(ε)) > WCR(ε, 1) = WRR(ε, 1) = WRR(ε, x
h
RR(ε)) (55)




RS > 0, so that we are in







Hence, ω > 0 implies that WCR(ε) < WRR(ε) for such high values of ε. Q.E.D.
B. General ex-post schemes
In this appendix we generalize two aspects of the main text. First, above we work with a reduced
form model where ex-post risk adjustment (reinsurance) increases healthcare expenditures.
Here we provide an explicit framework which implies this result. Second, above we derive our
main results, propositions 1–3, for the case of proportional risk adjustment where the insurer
gets a proportion x of costs reimbursed by the sponsor. In general, this reimbursement scheme
does not need to be linear. Below we show how the main equations of the proofs generalize to
non-linear reinsurance schemes.
For this we introduce the following notation. For each expression we provide the equivalent
in terms of proportional reimbursement as used above.
We assume that an insurer’s expenditure y − g is contractible for the sponsor, but not g
itself. If an insured needs treatment and the insurer spends z = y− g, then the insurer receives
ex post reimbursement r(z, x). The reimbursement function r is assumed to be smooth, satisfies
r(0, x) = 0 and rz ∈ [0, 1]: expenditure z is neither taxed nor subsidized more than one-for-
one. The index x ∈ [0, 1] parameterizing this family of reimbursement functions indicates the
generosity of the ex post scheme, rx ≥ 0. We normalize r(z, 0) = 0 and r(z, 1) = z. Further,
rxz ≥ 0, implying that a more generous scheme raises marginal reimbursement rz. In the main
text we work with r(z, x) = xz. An example of a more general scheme is to reimburse only
costs above a threshold z∗. This could be optimal if high costs are less elastic with respect to
insurer effort than low costs.




Define R(x, g|θ) as the expected costs, net of ex ante payment t and premium income p, for
an insurer of insuring a θ-consumer with a contract (p, g), when the insurer faces reinsurance
r(z, x). With proportional reimbursement we have R(x, g|θ) = (1− x)θ(y − g).
Let C(x, g|θ) denote the sponsor’s expected costs of financing an ex post scheme r(.) with
generosity x. By our normalization of x, we have that C(0, g|θ) = 0. In the main text we have
C(x, g, |θ) = xθ(y − g) + εα(x, g|θ).
The sponsor then chooses a function r(z, x) and offers a menu (tl, xl), (th, xh) to insurers,
where the insurer truthfully reveals the type (l, h) of its customer. For our analysis the function
r(.) is exogenous; given this function, we derive the optimal ti, xi.
Truthful revelation of the insurer’s private information θ requires the risk adjustment scheme
to be incentive compatible. The equivalent of equations (20, 21):
th +Rh ≤ tl + Rˆl
tl +Rl ≤ th + Rˆh
(56)
where we use short-hand notation: Rl = Rl(xl, gl) = R(xl, gl|θl), Rh = Rh(xh, gh) = R(xh, gh|θh)
and for an l-insurer who claims to be h: Rˆh = Rˆh(xh, gl) = R(xh, gl|θl). Similarly, an h-insurer
who claims to be l has expected costs Rˆl = Rˆl(xl, gh) = R(xl, gh|θh).
B.1. Model of insurer effort
This section introduces a simple model where insurers invest effort to keep health expenditures
low. We assume the function R(.) to have the following property
Rhx(x, 0) < Rˆ
h
x(x, g
l) < 0 (57)
To see the intuition for this and following equations, we use proportional reinsurance. As x
increases, the cost reduction is bigger for customers with higher expected costs. With propor-
tional reimbursement we get d
dx
(1 − x)θh(y − gh) < d
dx
(1 − x)θl(y − gl) because θh > θl and
gl ≥ gh = 0.
We derive the following equations that we need to generalize our three propositions in the
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main text:
Rh − Rˆh ≥ 0 (58)
Rx(x, g|θ) + Cx(x, g|θ) = εαx(x, g|θ) (59)
Rl(0, gl)− Rˆh ≥ 0 (60)
Rlg(0, g
l) = −θl (61)
|Rˆhg | ≤ θl (62)
First, Rh−Rˆh = (1−xh)(θh(y−gh)−θl(y−gl)) ≥ 0 because θh > θl, gl ≥ gh and –as in the main
text– an l-insurer claiming to be h has no incentive to change gl. Even if an l-insurer mimicks
an h-insurer, expected costs are lower for the l-insurer. Second, an increase in generosity x
increases the sum of costs R + C with εαx. Third, suppose that there is no ex post transfer
for l-consumers: xl = 0. If an l-insurer claims to be h, part of her costs are reimbursed ex
post which lowers ex post costs compared to the case where it truthfully reveals the customer’s
type. With proportional reimbursement this becomes: θl(y − gl) ≥ (1− xh)θl(y − gl). Fourth,
assuming xl = 0, a small increase in gl reduces the costs of an l-insurer by the probability θl
that gl is saved by the insurer: d(θ
l(y−g))
dg
= −θl. Finally, when an l-insurer claims to be h, part
of the expenditure is reimbursed ex post, hence the effect of an increase in g is smaller. With
proportional reimbursement | d
dg
(1− xh)θl(y − g)| ≤ | d
dg
θl(y − g)| = θl.
We define x¯h as the level of ex-post risk adjustment such that the l-insurer’s information
rent, Rh − Rˆh, disappears. That is, at xh = x¯h, the costs of an h-insurer equals the costs of an
l-insurer claiming to have an h-consumer:
Rh(x¯h, 0)− Rˆh(x¯h, gl) = 0 (63)
and
|Rˆhg (x¯h, gl)| < θl (64)
With proportional ex post reimbursement, we find (1−x¯h)[θhy−θl(y−gl)] = 0 and Rˆhg (x¯h, gl) =
0 < θl if x¯h = 1.
For the analysis here, these are the aspects of ex-post risk adjustment that are important.
The following model yields the required results.
Let Y denote the interval of expenditures y, once an agent falls ill. Insurers can invest
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effort e to reduce expenditure. Let F (y|e) denote the distribution function of y, which is the
same for both types l, h. Then comparing two effort levels e1 > e2, we assume that F (y|e2)
first order stochastically dominates F (y|e1). That is, F (y|e2) ≤ F (y|e1). Expected expenditure





First order stochastic dominance implies that y¯e(e) ≤ 0. The expected ex-post reimbursement
can be written as
r¯(x, g, e) =
∫
Y
r(y − g, x)dF (y|e) (66)
As rz ≥ 0, first order stochastic dominance implies that r¯e ≤ 0. Further, rz(z, x) ∈ [0, 1] implies
that r¯g(x, g, e) ∈ [−1, 0].
We assume that insurers’ effort cost ψ(e) is incurred once an insured needs treatment.
What we have in mind is the following: once a patient falls ill, the insurer can check whether
treatments are necessary, try to guide the patient to a cheaper provider etc. The insurer chooses
effort e that minimizes total costs:
R(x, g|θ) = min
e
θ[y¯(e)− g − r¯(x, g, e) + ψ(e)] (67)
Let e(x, g) denote the effort level that solves this minimization problem. In case of an interior
solution, we have
y¯e(e(x, g))− r¯e(x, g, e(x, g)) + ψe(e(x, g)) = 0 (68)
It follows that de/dx ≤ 0. This can be seen as follows:
[y¯ee(e(x, g))− r¯ee(x, g, e(x, g)) + ψee(e(x, g))]de
dx
= r¯ex(x, g, e(x, g)) (69)
The expression in square brackets is positive (second order condition) and the right hand side
is non-positive (first order stochastic dominance with rxz(z, x) ≥ 0). Hence, we find de/dx ≤ 0:
as the ex-post reimbursement becomes more generous, insurers invest less effort.
The cost for the sponsor of implementing ex-post insurance with generosity x is given by
C(x, g|θ) = θr¯(x, g, e(x, g)) (70)
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Total cost can then be written as
R(x, g|θ) + C(x, g|θ) = θ(y¯(e(x, g))− g + ψ(e(x, g))) (71)
Hence we find that
Rx(x, g|θ) + Cx(x, g|θ) = θ(y¯e(e(x, g)) + ψe(e(x, g))de
dx
(72)




where the second equality follows from (68); the inequality follows from r¯e ≤ 0 and de/dx ≤ 0
derived above. Writing αx(x, g|θ) = θr¯ede/dx ≥ 0, we find equation (59).
The following inequalities derive equation (58):
Rh(x, 0) = R(x, 0|θh) = θh[y¯(e(x, 0))− r¯(x, 0, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (74)
θl[y¯(e(x, 0))− r¯(x, 0, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (75)
θl[y¯(e(x, 0))− gl − r¯(x, gl, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (76)
θl[y¯(e(x, gl))− gl − r¯(x, gl, e(x, gl)) + ψ(e(x, gl))] = R(x, gl|θl) = Rˆh(x, gl) (77)
where the first inequality follows from θh > θl, the second from gl ≥ 0 and r¯g ∈ [−1, 0], the
third inequality from the fact that e(x, gl) minimizes the insurer’s cost with an l-insured.
With a similar reasoning we can prove (60):
Rl(0, gl) = θl[y¯(e(0, gl))− gl + ψ(e(0, gl))] ≥ (78)
θl[y¯(e(0, gl))− gl − r¯(x, gl, e(0, gl)) + ψ(e(0, gl))] ≥ (79)
θl[y¯(e(x, gl))− gl − r¯(x, gl, e(x, gl)) + ψ(e(x, gl))] = Rˆh(x, gl) (80)
Finally,
Rg(x, g|θl) = Rˆhg (x, g) = −θl(1 + r¯g(x, g, e)) ≥ −θl (81)
because r¯g ∈ [−1, 0]; which proves (62). Further, r¯(0, g, e) = 0 for all g ≥ 0; hence Rg(0, g|θl) =
−θl: equation (61).
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B.2. Generalizing the three main results
In this section we show how the three propositions above can be proved with the more general
reinsurance set-up in this appendix. The previous version of the paper –available on request–
gives the complete proofs with this set-up, here we focus on the main equations of each proof.




= (1− φ)εαx(xh, 0|θh)(ωulp + (1− ω)uhp)− (Rhx − Rˆhx)(|uhp |φ(1− ω)− |ulp|ω(1− φ))
where −(Rhx − Rˆhx) > 0 giving us a similar expression as (37). Hence, the important feature is
that an increase in x reduces the information rent Rh − Rˆh. The argument follows that in the
proof above by evaluating xh close x¯h instead of 1.















where, again, −(Rhx − Rˆhx) > 0 and 0 ≤ Rˆhg + θl ≤ θh + Rˆhg by equation (62). So also here we
find that xh = x¯h is optimal in case ε = 0 and remains optimal for ε > 0 but small.
























where the inequality follows from (Rˆhg + θ




CR(ε)) > WCR(ε, x¯
h) = WRR(ε, x¯
h) = WRR(ε, x
h
RR(ε))
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